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Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs (Website)

Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs (Website)

AI Stolen Thoughts
Researchers discovered that encrypted reasoning traces in frontier LLM APIs can be intercepted and replayed to recover private chain-of-thought data.
What: Alexander Panfilov and colleagues demonstrated that they could reconstruct private reasoning blocks from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google APIs by replaying encrypted tokens into weaker 'sibling' models, ultimately recovering 704 sensitive artifacts including API keys and passwords.
Why it matters: The industry's move toward showing users 'hidden' reasoning introduces a massive, previously non-existent attack surface where model 'thoughts' leak secrets that developers assume are not part of the final output.
Takeaway: Do not pass secrets, passwords, or PII into LLM prompts, even if you do not see them in the model's final response, as they may be exposed in the reasoning trace.
Deep dive
  • Reasoning traces are often 'encrypted' by providers but are inherently replayable.
  • The attack works by replaying these blocks into less-guarded versions of the model.
  • Researchers successfully bypassed anti-distillation safeguards.
  • Recovered data includes AWS keys, GitHub tokens, and personal PII.
  • 64 artifacts were found exclusively in reasoning traces and were absent from the visible model answer.
  • The attack is effective across Claude, GPT, and Gemini frontier models.
  • Reasoning token count acts as a fingerprint for the hidden trace.
Decoder
  • Chain-of-Thought: A technique where a model breaks down a complex problem into intermediate steps before generating the final answer.
  • PII (Personally Identifiable Information): Data that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as email addresses or postal codes.
  • Distillation: The process of training a smaller model to replicate the behavior of a larger, more powerful model.
Original article

We demonstrate this across frontier models from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google. The decoded reasoning closely tracks the number of hidden thinking tokens reported by the API. Each point below corresponds to one of 120 Codeforces problems: the horizontal axis shows the hidden thinking-token count reported by the API, while the vertical axis shows the token count of the decoded reasoning when passed back to the model as input.

We collected 6,708 publicly available agent trajectories from GitHub and Hugging Face, produced by Claude, GPT, and Gemini models and still containing encrypted reasoning blocks. Applying our decoding pipeline to every signed block yielded 315,320 reconstructed reasoning blocks.

These hidden traces contain real secrets and sensitive information. Restricting to genuine, non-benchmark user sessions, we recovered 704 distinct privacy artifacts, including 62 API keys, 33 passwords, 24 access tokens, and 30 personal email addresses, alongside names, postal addresses, internal URLs, and other technical identifiers.

Of those 704 artifacts, 64 appeared exclusively inside the reasoning blocks and nowhere in the visible session.

Decoded reasoning traces from benchmark runs and public sessions in the wild. Each example shows a selected passage from the recovered reasoning, with a short headline and highlights generated by Claude Opus 5 to make the traces easier to browse.

The case of Kimi-K3

Prefilling Kimi-K3's reasoning with the first 1% of tokens of Opus 4.8's reasoning moves its visible answer toward Opus's wording, even though the answer itself is never prefilled. Each card is one HLE problem: the seed Kimi-K3 was given, its answer with and without that seed, and the Opus answer they are compared against.

Jailbreaking for misuse uplift

Prompting a model to reason through harmful content while keeping its visible answer benign leaves hazardous knowledge inside the hidden trace. Our attack recovers that reasoning in plaintext. Captured from Opus 4.8, decoded with Haiku 4.5.

Summary unfaithfulness

For some AIME problems Opus 4.8 sometimes states the answer before deriving it. We find that the API summary does not always preserve this distinction, and can instead make the reasoning appear like a clean derivation.

BibTeX

@misc{panfilov2026stealing,
  title         = {Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs},
  author        = {Alexander Panfilov and David Schmotz and Ilia Shumailov and
                   Luca Beurer-Kellner and Joachim Schaeffer and Ameya Prabhu and
                   Jonas Geiping and Maksym Andriushchenko},
  year          = {2026},
  eprint        = {2608.09867},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url           = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09867}
}
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